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It’s Elementary




This is the first of three columns on an interesting, hypothesized phenomenon called the 
renter effect. This column explains what this effect is and why it might arise. The second column 
explores the empirical evidence concerning the renter effect, and the third column explores the 
policy implications of this effect, should it prove to exist. 
 
 The term “renter effect” was coined by Wallace Oates. His definition of this effect has 
two parts. For the first part he writes “other things equal, the larger the fraction of renters in a 
community, the higher the level of local public spending per capita. This is the phenomenon that 
I am calling ‘the renter effect.’”1  The second part concerns the cause of this outcome. As Oates 
put it, the renter effect “is the propensity of renters to think for whatever reasons that they pay a 
very low (perhaps zero) tax-price for local public services.” These two parts are connected 
because voters respond to a tax-price (to be defined below) the same way they respond to any 
other price; a lower tax price implies a higher demand for public services, all else equal. Putting 
these two parts together, therefore, the renter effect is the impact of renters’ low tax prices (real 
or imagined) on their demand for public services, holding everything except tax price constant. 
 
 Thus, the renter effect as the term is used here (and by Oates) has nothing to do with 
differences between owners and renters in incomes or in preferences for public services. Instead, 
it only has to do with the possibility that renters may perceive that they have low tax prices 
compared to owners so that they demand a higher level of public services than owners with the 
same income and preferences. 
 
 A voter’s tax price for a particular public services is the amount she must pay through the 
local tax system (which, for the purposes of this column means through the property tax) for a 
one-unit increase in the level of this service in her community. As shown by many scholars, a tax 
price has two components.2  The first, which is called the tax share, is the increase in a 
household’s property tax payment when the property tax rate increases enough to raise $1 per 
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household. If all households in a community are alike, the tax share is $1 for everyone. More 
realistically, however, households with relatively expensive houses have a higher tax share than 
those whose houses have below-average values. The marginal cost of a public service depends 
on the characteristics of a community. The marginal cost of services is the same for everyone in 
the same community, but it differs widely across communities. As many of my previous columns 
have discussed, for example, the cost of public education in much higher in a community with a 
high poverty rate than in a community where poverty is rare.3  
 
The tax share is different for owners and renters because owners must write a check to 
the local government, whereas renters face no such requirement. If renters do pay any of the 
property tax, it is because landlords, who are the ones writing property tax checks, are able to 
pass some of the burden on to their tenants in the form of higher rents.  
 
Even with full shifting of the property tax onto tenants, the renter effect could arise 
because individual apartments tend to have smaller assessed values, and hence smaller property 
tax shares, than houses.4   According to standard incidence theory, however, full shifting of the 
property tax onto tenants is unlikely, at least in an area with many different local governments. 
So long as a reasonable share of tenants have alternative locations from which to choose, a 
landlord cannot fully shift property taxes onto tenants without driving them away.5  Thus, the 
renter effect could arise because of the relatively low market values of apartments, partial 
shifting of property taxes into rents, or renters’ belief in either of these possibilities. 
  
Further analysis of the renter effect must address two issues. The first issue is that one 
can observe community level demands but not, in general, the demands of individual voters. As a 
result, the demand for public services is usually analyzed using what is called a “median voter 
model.”  The basic idea behind this type of model is that the household in the middle of the 
distribution of demands for a public service, who is the median voter, always votes on the 
winning side, so their demand determines the outcome. Scholars have shown that, under some 
conditions, the voter with the median income and the median tax share is the median voter. So a 
standard demand analysis looks at the outcome for a public service at the community level as a 
function of the community’s median income and tax share. 
 
Unfortunately, however, this approach runs into difficulty when a community contains 
both owners and renters. The median tax share for owners is relatively easy to observe. In the 
case of education, for example, it can be shown to equal the median house value in a community 
divided by the community’s property value per pupil. The median tax share for renters cannot be 
3  See, for example, my November 2013 column. The distinction between within-community and across-
community variation in marginal cost will prove to be important in my next column. 
 
4  Apartments are not, of course, individually assessed, but they have an implicit assessed value based on 
the assessed value of the building in which they are located. 
 
5  As pointed out by Robert J. Carroll and John Yinger (“Is the Property Tax a Benefit Tax? The Case of 
Rental Housing,” National Tax Journal, June 1994, pp. 295-316), mobile tenants are willing to pay more 
for an apartment in a community with better public services but are not willing to pay more simply 
because property taxes are higher, holding public services constant. 
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observed, however, because it depends on the extent of tax shifting, which is unknown. 
Moreover, even if the median renter tax share could be observed, the overall median tax share in 
the community could not be calculated, because it depends on the extent to which the owner and 
renter tax-share distributions overlap.  
 
One way to handle this situation, which was introduced by Oates, is to assume that the 
perceived tax share of every renter household falls below the median tax share for owners. In this 
case, the use of the median owner tax share in a demand regression overstates the median tax 
share in the community, and the degree of overstatement increases with the community’s renter 
share. Including the percentage of households who are renters in an estimated demand equation 
can therefore be seen as a rough correction for this overstatement—and as a test of the renter 
effect. Like any price variable, the owner tax-share variable is expected to have a negative sign, 
so the renter effect predicts a positive sign for the percent-renter variable. 
 
The second issue is that renters differ from owners in another important way that works 
in the opposite direction from the renter effect, namely, that increases in the rents for their 
apartments represent a cost to them, not a capital gain. As many scholars have shown, an 
increase in the quality of local public services results in higher house values, so people who own 
a home receive a capital gain when the increase takes place.6  They can either stay in their house 
and receive the higher public services or sell their house and receive the present value of the 
increase in services as a capital gain. Service quality increases also lead to rent increases. Renters 
benefit from an improvement in local public services, but the value of this benefit is cancelled 
out by an increase in their rent. Indeed, one might argue that renters do not care about the public 
service level because of this link to rents.7    
 
The impact of public service quality on rents has not been studied as much as the impact 
of public service quality on house values. Nevertheless, several studies, including one by Oates, 
have found that rents do reflect public service quality.8   If these studies are correct, it is difficult 
to see how the renter effect could arise. After all, renters are the ones who bid more for 
apartments in places where public services are higher (all else equal), so it is implausible to 
assume that renters are unaware of this relationship when they vote for local public services. 
With full reflection of service quality in rents and no renter illusion, renters will be indifferent to 
service quality increases, and their voting behavior will not be influenced by their tax share, real 




                                                 
9  I do not know of any data on lease lengths. Renter mobility is documented at 
http://sasweb.ssd.census.gov/ahs/ahstablecreator.html. 
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demand regression—with no need for a correction. Under these conditions, the renter effect will 
not exist. 
 
One theoretical possibility is that renters have long, fixed-rent leases so that they do not 
have to worry about rent increases offsetting the benefits they would receive from improvements 
in local public service quality. In fact, however, renters tend to be quite mobile; one-quarter of 
renters have moved within the last year. Moreover, my impression is that most leases are either 
month-to-month or one year in duration.9  Even if the benefits from service improvements are 
only partially offset by rent increases, however, the positive impact of low renter tax shares on 
renter demand might be smaller than the negative impact of the rent increases tenants expect to 
occur. 
 
In summary, the renter effect arises when a relatively low tax share perceived by renters, 
all else equal, induces them to demand more public services. The case for a renter effect relies on 
the likely incomplete shifting of property taxes onto tenants. What is not so widely recognized, 
however, is that arguments for the renter effect implicitly assume either that renters do not bid 
more for otherwise-equivalent apartments in communities with higher-quality public services or 
that they forget about these higher bids when they go into the voting booth. 
 
 
 
